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1. The federal environmental regulatory framework imposes various effluent,
emission, release limitations, record keeping, monitoring, and reporting re-
quirements under various statutes including the Clean Air Act ("CAA"), Pub. L.
No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-
7671 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)) (regulation of stationary and other sources of air
pollution); the Clean Water Act ("CWA"), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988 &
Supp. V 1993) (regulation of pollutant discharges into the waters of the United
States from "point sources" and of discharge of dredged or fill materials into
navigable waters, and reporting requirements); the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act of 1976 ("RCRA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992 (1988 & Supp. V
1993) (regulation of owners and operators of hazardous waste treatment, storage,
and disposal facilities as well as generators and transporters of hazardous waste);
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of
1980 ("CERCLA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988 & Supp. V 1993), as amend-
ed by Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 ("SARA"), 42
U.S.C. §§ 9621-9675 note 9675 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (dealing with
remediation related to releases and threatened releases of hazardous substances);
the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act ("EPCRA"), 42
U.S.C. §§ 11,001-11,049 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (requiring emergency planning
and reporting by owners and operators of facilities that use, store or manufacture
hazardous chemicals); and the Toxic Substances Control Act ("TSCA"), 15
U.S.C. §§ 2601-2692 (1994)(regulation of manufacturers, processors, and distrib-
utors of chemical substances and mixtures). See generally James G. Archer et al.,
SEC Reporting of Environmental Liabilities, 20 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
10,105 (Mar. 1990).
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the penalties imposed for non-compliance with these regulations
can have a material impact on a company's operations and,
ultimately, its profitability.3 Perhaps the most potent weapon the
United States Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") wields is
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and
Liability Act of 1980,' which courts have consistently held to
impose strict, and retroactive, as well as, joint and several liability
on parties to clean up inactive waste sites.' A recent study
estimated that the nationwide aggregate cost to all corporations
subject to Superfund site remediation exceeds over $750 billion.6
2. Penalties for non-compliance with environmental statutes can be substan-
tial. They include administrative enforcement actions, civil enforcement penalties,
criminal penalties, and injunctive relief. Some of the larger penalties include
RCRA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6928(a)(3),(c) (1988) (subjecting a violator to a compliance
order or civil action for injunctive or civil penalties of $25,000 per day and sus-
pension or revocation of permit); CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(2)(B) (1988) (sub-
jecting a violator to possible fines of up to $10,000 per day not to exceed
$125,000); and EPCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 11,045(b) (1988) (subjecting violators to
penalties of not more than $25,000 per violation per day for violations of emer-
gency notification and reporting requirements, increasing to $75,000 per day for
second and subsequent violations).
3. Recent examples of costly penalties for the violation of environmental
statutes include the following: Allied-Signal Inc. "expect[ed] actual environmental
outlays of thirty million to forty million in [1989 and 1990]" and this did not in-
clude 100 sites that may result in unstated future liabilities; Bofors Nobel Inc.
was forced to liquidate because the clean-up cost at a single plant site was $60
million, more than twice its annual sales; Bethlehem Steel will spend approxi-
mately $92 million over five years for new controls on air emissions for its Spar-
rows Point, Maryland coke ovens pursuant to an administrative consent order;
Rockwell International told its shareholders that it faced as much as $130 million
in liability for environmental cleanups in anticipation of SEC enforcement of
Staff Accounting Bulletin 92 ("SAB 92"); Exxon reserved $850 million in quar-
terly earnings to finance clean up of oil from the Exxon Valdez spill, reducing its
second quarter of fiscal 1989 earnings from $1.01 billion to $160 million. Amal
K. Naj, See No Evil: Can $100 Billion Have "No Material Effect" on Balance
Sheets?, WALL ST. J., May 11, 1988, at Al.
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675.
5. See, e.g., United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1988),
cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1106 (1989); New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d
1032 (2d Cir. 1985); United States v. Bliss, 667 F. Supp. 1298 (E.D. Mo. 1987);
United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
6. Roberts Predicts Widespread Concern With Disclosing Environmental
DISCLOSURE STANDARDS
The astronomical cost of environmental remediation has alarmed
the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC").7 As authorized
by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("the Exchange Act"),8 the
SEC promulgates rules governing corporate disclosures. 9 Only in
the last twenty-five years has the SEC focused on the need for
environmental liability disclosures ("ELDs")."' The growing
number of "ethical investors," individuals and institutions seeking
to merge investment decisions with moral principles, has heightened
the need for environmental liability disclosures by United States
corporations."
The SEC has sought to balance the needs of ethical investors
against the burden placed upon corporations in two ways. 2 First,
Liabilities, 25 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1620 (Dec. 3, 1993). In an address to
the Environment, Energy, and Natural Resources Section of the District of Co-
lumbia Bar, SEC Commissioner Richard Roberts said that a majority of estimated
cleanup costs, amounting to as high as $750 billion, had yet to be reflected in
corporate financial statements. Id.
7. Id. Roberts told the Bar that the "vigorous enforcement of environmental
laws likely to occur in the decade to come have made [concerns of] environmen-
tal liability of grow[ in] prominence . . . ." Id.
8. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-781l (1994).
9. Id. §§ 77g, 77j(c). These sections require disclosure of such other infor-
mation "as the Commission may by rules or regulations require as being neces-
sary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors." Id.
The SEC's general regulatory power is provided in § 19(a) of the Securities Act
of 1933 ("the Securities Act"), which authorizes the Securities and Exchange
Commission to promulgate such rules "as may be necessary to carry out the
provisions of this subchapter .... " Id. § 77s(a). Section 23(a) of the Securities
Act grants the SEC power "as may be necessary to implement the provisions of
this chapter for which [it is] responsible or for the execution of the functions
vested in [it] by this chapter .... " Id. § 78w(a). In addition, the Securities Act
gives the SEC rulemaking authority. Id. Section 12(b) provides that the SEC may
require in securities registration applications such information respecting the
issuer's organization, financial structure, nature of business, and financial state-
ments as it deems "necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the pro-
tection of investors .... "Id. § 781(b)(1).
10. See infra part I; Natural Resources Defense Council v. SEC, 606 F.2d
1031, 1036-37 (D.C. Cir. 1979) [hereinafter NRDC II1]; Natural Resources De-
fense Council v. SEC, 389 F. Supp. 689, 692-93 (D.D.C. 1974) [hereinafter
NRDC I].
11. NRDC 1, 389 F. Supp. at 693, affd, 432 F. Supp. 1190 (D.D.C. 1977)
[hereinafter NRDC II], rev'd, NRDC III, 606 F.2d 1031.
12. For over twenty years, "the SEC has attempted to clarify the extent of the
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the SEC has attempted to enforce ELD regulations via Rule lOb-
5.13 Secondly, the SEC has increased disclosure requirements to
encourage corporate adoption of more responsible environmental
policies. 4 An early result of the SEC's attempt to balance
conflicting needs was Securities Act Release Number 5170, which
mandates the disclosure of current environmental compliance
costs.
15
Inconsistencies within or inadequacies of company disclosures of
environmental liabilities revealed by subsequent media attention,
however, soon made it apparent that clarification of ELD
requirements was necessary. 6 The SEC attempted to meet this
need in a variety of ways. Two prominent examples are the SEC
Forms 10-K (annual) and 10-Q (quarterly) reporting require-
ethical investor interest in environmental disclosure." Elizabeth A. Glass Geltman,
The Pendulum Swings Back: Why the SEC Should Rethink Its Policies on Disclo-
sure of Environmental Liabilities, 5 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 323, 325 (1994).
13. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1995) [hereinafter "Rule lOb-5"]. The Rule pro-
vides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails
or of any facility of any national securities exchange, (a) [t]o employ
any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, (b) [t]o make any untrue
statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact neces-
sary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circum-
stances under which they were made, not misleading, or (c) [t]o en-
gage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security.
Id.
14. See, e.g., Adoption of Amendments, Securities Exchange Act Release No.
10,116, [1973 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) [79,342 (Apr. 20,
1973) [hereinafter "Release 10,116"]; Disclosures Pertaining to Matters Involving
the Environment and Civil Rights, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9252,
[1970-1971 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) [ 78,150 (July 19, 1971)
[hereinafter "Release 9252"]. The above-referenced releases will be discussed
infra Part I.
15. Disclosures Pertaining to Matters Involving the Environment and Civil
Rights, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 5170, [1970-1971 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) [ 78,150 (July 19, 1971). The SEC defined current
environmental compliance costs as consisting of "material compliance costs" and
"legal proceedings." Id.
16. Glass Geltman, supra note 12, at 326-27 & n.18.
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ments."7 Failure to make necessary, complete and accurate
disclosure on these forms can result in civil and criminal liability
under federal securities laws."8 In theory, the reporting rules
required concise disclosure of liability data. 9 In practice, however,
the scope of "necessary, complete and accurate"'2 disclosure
remained ambiguous, resulting in excessive burdens upon reporting
companies and, paradoxically, in decreased ELD quality.2 The
17. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13a-13 (1995). It states in relevant part:
[except as provided in paragraphs (b) and (c) of this section, every
issuer that has securities registered pursuant to section 12 of the Act
and is required to file annual reports pursuant to section 13 of the Act,
and has filed or intends to file such reports on Form 10-K and Form
10-KSB (§249.310 of this chapter) or U5S (§259.5s of this chapter)
shall file a quarterly report on Form 10-Q and Form 1O-QSB
(§249.308a of this chapter) within the period specified in General
Instruction A.1. to that form for each of the first three quarters of
each fiscal year of the issuer, commencing with the first fiscal quarter
following the most recent fiscal year for which full financial state-
ments were included in the registration statement ....
Id.
18. See generally Archer et. al., supra note 1; see infra, part I.
19. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m. Section 78 states in relevant part:
(a) [elvery issuer of a security registered pursuant to section 781 of
this title shall file with the Commission, in accordance with such rules
and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or
appropriate for the proper protection of investors and to insure fair
dealing in the security-
(1) such information and documents (and such copies thereof) as
the Commission shall require to keep reasonably current the
information and documents required to be included in or filed
with an application or registration statement filed pursuant to
section 781 of this title. ...
(2) such annual reports (and such copies thereof), certified if re-
quired by the rules and regulations of the Commission by inde-
pendent public accountants, and such quarterly reports (and such
copies thereof), as the Commission may prescribe.
Id.
20. Id. § 77g.
21. See Glass Geltman, supra note 12, at 329. While reporting requirements
increased, the confusion generated by many of the releases resulted in incomplete
or inaccurate disclosures. Id. at 331.
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release of Staff Accounting Bulletin Number 92 ("SAB 92"),2" is
the most recent attempt by the SEC to curtail ELD shortcomings. 3
SAB 92 clarifies accounting principles at the heart of the full
disclosure philosophy of federal securities laws. 4
This Note examines the SEC's effort to balance ethical investors'
needs against excessive corporate reporting requirements under
SAB 92. Part I of this Note examines past SEC attempts to compel
compliance with corporate environmental disclosure obligations.
Part II traces the evolution of Rule lOb-5 case law and how it can
be applied to a claim that a registrant should disclose its non-
compliance with environmental laws. Part III describes SAB 92 and
its projected impact upon investors and companies. This Note
concludes by asserting that SAB 92 will encourage responsible
corporate disclosure of environmental liabilities, will lead to better-
informed investors, and in the long run, will benefit both investors
and disclosing corporations.
I. A HISTORY OF PRE-SAB 92 ENVIRONMENTAL DISCLOSURE
REQUIREMENTS
Federal securities laws consist of six separate statutes and corre-
sponding implementing regulations enacted between 1933 and
1940.' The Congress enacted these laws primarily to serve two
22. 58 Fed. Reg. 32,843 (1993).
23. Glass Geltman, supra note 12, at 361-63. Currently, the SEC is "sharing
data with the EPA and has vowed to increase enforcement for failure to disclose
contingent environmental liabilities." Id. at 362.
24. Id. at 362-63. The goal of SAB 92 is to promote recognition and disclo-
sure of environmental liabilities through stricter accounting guidelines. Id. SAB
92 provides a clear indication that S-K corporation disclosure and accounting of
environmental loss contingencies will be subject to stricter standards for timely
and comprehensive disclosure of environmental liabilities. Id. at 367. See Casey
Bukro, Facing Costs of Cleanup; SEC Tells Firms to Book Liability, CHI. TRIB.,
Feb. 7, 1994, at Al.
25. The six acts are: the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa
(1994); the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-7811 (1994); the
Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. §§ 79-79z(6) (1994);
the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa-77bbb (1994); the Invest-
ment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a(l)-80a(64) (1994); and the In-
vestment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b(1)-80b(21) (1994). See Eliza-
beth A. Glass Geltman, Disclosure of Contingent Environmental Liabilities by
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distinct goals: (1) to allow for intelligent investment decisions by
requiring sufficient disclosure of information, and (2) to control
fraud and market manipulation in securities trading. 26 The Con-
gress imposed disclosure obligations upon issuers of publicly-traded
securities under the Securities Act 27 and the Exchange Act.28 The
legislative philosophy underlying the Exchange Act was to ensure
honest markets through public scrutiny.29 Accordingly, the Ex-
change Act established reporting requirements for publicly held
companies."
In the early 1970s, an increasingly concerned public focused its
attention on the lack of company disclosure regarding environmen-
tal liabilities.3 Companies faced liability and compliance obliga-
tions under federal environmental laws and regulations as well as
under traditional common law principles.32
Public Companies Under the Federal Securities Laws, 16 HARv. ENvTL. L. REv.
129, 129 (1992).
26. Glass Geltman, supra note 12, at 330 (citing SEC v. Southwest Coal &
Energy Co., 624 F.2d 1312, 1318 (5th Cir. 1980)).
27. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1988). The Securities Act regulates public offer-
ings.
28. Id. §§ 78a-7811 (1988). The Exchange Act governs periodic and annual
reporting by public companies.
29. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 230 (citing S. Rep. No. 792, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. 1-5 (1934)); Glass Geltman, supra note 12, at 331 n.42 (citing S.
REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1-5 (1934) and H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1934)).
30. For instance, corporations registered under Section 12 of the Exchange
Act must file periodic reports disclosing certain categories of material events and
financial conditions. 15 U.S.C. § 781 (1994).
31. In a message to the Congress, President Nixon stated, "[a]s concern with
the condition of our physical environment has intensified, it has become increas-
ingly clear that we need to know more about the environment. [T]he present
government structure for dealing with environmental pollution often defies effec-
tive and concerted action." Reorg. Plan No. 3 of 1970, 35 Fed. Reg. 15,623
(1970).
32. Philip B. Schwartz, Disclosure Requirements for Environmental Liabilities
Under Federal Securities Law, at 295, 298 (ALI-ABA Course of Study Materials,
No. C903, Feb. 24, 1994). Liability under common law often resulted in "toxic
tort" litigation. Id. Significant federal environmental laws affecting public com-
pany disclosure include: CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988 & Supp. V
1993); RCRA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992 (1988 & Supp. V 1993); CAA, 42
U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (1988 & Supp. V 1993); CWA, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387
82 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. VII
A. A History of SEC Interpretive Releases
Following the passage of the National Environmental Policy Act
of 1969 ("NEPA"),33 the SEC issued an interpretive release34
alerting businesses that SEC regulations mandate the reporting of
current environmental compliance costs.35 The SEC also warned of
forthcoming legal proceedings against non-complying compa-
nies." Inconsistent and sporadic reporting in response to Release
No. 9252 led the SEC to issue a superseding release in 1973. 37 Re-
lease No. 10,116 underscored key elements of Release No. 9252:
the reporting of legal proceedings and costs arising from material
compliance.38  In addition, Release No. 10,116 expanded
(1988 & Supp. V 1993); TSCA, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2692 (1994).
33. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1988 & Supp. III 1991). NEPA mandates that
the federal government use "all practicable means and measures" to protect envi-
ronmental values when administering federal programs. Id. § 4331(a). See also
Exec. Order No. 12,114, 3 C.F.R. 356 (1980), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 4321
(1988) (establishing that "the Department of State and Council on Environmental
Quality, in collaboration with other interested Federal agencies and other na-
tions," shall exchange information concerning the environment in order to height-
en international awareness of environmental concerns).
34. Release 9252, supra note 14.
35. The SEC examined five environmental disclosure alternatives that were
proposed in its public proceeding: (1) comprehensive disclosure of the environ-
mental effects of corporate activities; (2) disclosure of corporate noncompliance
with applicable environmental standards; (3) disclosure of all pending environ-
mental litigation; (4) disclosure of general corporate environmental policy; and
(5) disclosure of all capital expenditures and expenses for environmental purpos-
es. The SEC rejected alternatives (1), (3), (4), and (5), but decided to adopt alter-
native (2). 40 Fed. Reg. at 51,662. The SEC required that companies report com-
pliance costs under statutory requirements when compliance "may necessitate
significant capital outlays, may materially affect the earning power of the busi-
ness, or cause material changes in registrant's business done or intended to be
done." Release 9252, supra note 14, at 80,488.
36. Release 9252, supra note 14. The SEC further requested that registrants
furnish supplemental information on any proceedings omitted from disclosure on
the ground that it is not material. Id.
37. Release 10,116, supra note 14. The SEC sought "more meaningful disclo-
sure of certain items pertaining to business and litigation, and particularly as to
the effect upon the issuer's business of compliance with Federal, State and local
laws and regulations relating to the protection of the environment." id. at 83,029.
38. Release 10,116, supra note 14.
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registrants' disclosure obligations to include disclosure of present
and future compliance costs,39 as well as all administrative or ju-
dicial proceedings initiated by a governmental authority, regardless
of materiality. 4' Release No. 10,116 indicated that administrative
or judicial proceedings regulating materials discharged into the
environment could not be treated as ordinary litigation incidental to
company business.4 As a result, these proceedings had to be re-
ported.42 More importantly, proceedings involving governmental
entities, regardless of their significance, were deemed material.43
Release No. 10,116 set the materiality threshold for these claims
at ten percent of the assets of reporting companies and their subsid-
iaries, on a consolidated basis." The release allowed reporting
companies to group together similar proceedings if they were ma-
terial in the aggregate (with the exception of proceedings involving
governmental entities).45 Multiple proceedings involving potential
aggregate claims for damages exceeding ten percent of a reporting
company's current assets had to be individually described.'
Following Release 10,116 in 1973, public interest organizations
brought action in an attempt to compel the SEC to promulgate even
more stringent ELD rules.47 These groups sought a rule requiring
every Section 12 company" to disclose the entire effect of its
39. Id.
40. Id. This disclosure requirement extended broadly to all "material legal
proceedings 'known to be contemplated by governmental authorities."' Compli-
ance with Environmental Requirements, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-
10,116 and 33-5386, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 23,507A(II)(A) (Apr. 20, 1973).
41. Environmental Disclosure Requirements, Securities Exchange Act Release
No. 33-6130 and 34-16,224, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 23,507B(B)(1) (Sept. 27,
1979).
42. Id. at 23,507B(B)(2).
43. Id. The SEC specifically recognized in its release that its description of
proceedings required to be disclosed was very broad. Id.
44. This disclosure requirement extended broadly to all "material legal pro-
ceedings 'known to be contemplated by governmental authorities."' Compliance
with Environmental Requirements, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-
10,116 and 33-5386, supra note 40, at 23,507A(II)(C)-(D).
45. Id. at 23,507A(II)(E)(D).
46. Id.
47. NRDC I, 389 F. Supp. 689, 696 (D.D.C. 1974).
48. Section 12 of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78(l)(g), states in relevant
19951
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corporate activities on the environment.49 The public interest
groups argued that existing corporate environmental disclosure re-
quirements were insufficient to provide investors with the necessary
information required to make "socially responsible" and financially
sound investment decisions."
These judicial proceedings, while ultimately unsuccessful,51 led
the SEC to undertake further rule-making and to refine its existing
environmental disclosure policies.5" In 1976, the SEC added the
part:
(1) every issuer which is engaged in interstate commerce, or in
a business affecting interstate commerce, or whose securities are
traded by use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of
interstate commerce...
(2) the provisions of this subsection shall not apply in respect
of-
(A) any security listed and registered on a national securi-
ties exchange.
(B) any security issued by an investment company regis-
tered pursuant to section 80a-8 of this title...
(G) any security issued by an insurance company ....
Id.
49. NRDC 1, 389 F. Supp. at 692.
50. Id. at 694. Plaintiffs also argued that insufficient disclosure requirements
stymied the mandate of NEPA to interpret the securities laws to the fullest extent
possible in accordance with the environmental policy adopted in NEPA. Id.
51. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that "[a]lthough
Congress in NEPA, made environmental considerations part of the SEC's sub-
stantive mission, we do not believe that NEPA goes so far as to require the SEC
to promulgate specific rules." NRDC III, 606 F.2d 1031, 1045 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
52. Notice of Commission Conclusions and Final Action on the Rulemaking
Proposals Announced in Securities Exchange Act Release No. 5627 (Oct. 14,
1975) Relating to Environmental Disclosure, Securities Exchange Act Release
No. 12,414 [1975-76 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 80,495 (May
6, 1976) [hereinafter "Release 12,414"]. The SEC stated that:
[bly requiring a description of all [governmental] litigation, regardless
of whether the amount of money involved is itself material, the [SEC]
believes it has given recognition to both the importance of the national
environmental policy and to the far-reaching effects, both financial
and environmental, of violations of environmental laws. Further, the
fact that legal action, both pending and known to be contemplated,
must be disclosed serves to foreshadow potentially serious environ-
mental problems facing [companies].
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requirement that reporting companies must "disclose any material
estimated capital expenditures for environmental control facilities
for the remainder of its current fiscal year, the succeeding fiscal
year, and such further periods as deemed material."53
In 1979, the SEC issued a subsequent interpretive release that
elaborated its existing environmental disclosure requirements.54
The release was a three-pronged attempt by the SEC to disseminate
its policies with respect to environmental disclosure.55 In address-
ing these issues, the SEC stressed that specific environmental dis-
closure rules were to be construed liberally.56
First, the SEC determined that the disclosure obligation "is trig-
gered whenever governmental authority is a party to any adminis-
Id.; see Glass Geltman, supra note 12, at 341.
53. Release 12,414, supra note 52. In the same release, the SEC admonished
reporting companies to disclose Notices of Violation in the nature of cease and
desist orders issued by the EPA. Id.
54. Environmental Disclosure Requirements, Securities Exchange Act Release
No. 16,224, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) J[ 23,507(B) (Sept. 27, 1979). This release
was part of a settlement order, issued on the same day as the release, entered into
between the SEC and United States Steel Corporation ("USSC"). In the Matter of
United States Steel Corp., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 16,223
[1979-1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 82,319 (Sept. 27, 1979).
In United States Steel Corp., the dependent corporation failed to report
estimates of material capital expenditures beyond the subsequent two to three
years as required. Id. at 82,334. Additionally, USSC failed to disclose other
pending environmental proceedings and administrative orders. Id. Finally, USSC
failed to disclose any Notices of Violation or less formal communications indicat-
ing that government authorities were considering an environmental enforcement
action that would have required material capital expenditures. Id.
55. In the Matter of United States Steel Corp., Securities Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 16,223, supra note 54, at 82,383. The release addressed the following
issues:
(i) when must a corporation disclose, in addition to its planned envi-
ronmental expenditures for the next two fiscal years, the total costs of
compliance with environmental statutes;
(ii) what disclosures must be made concerning administrative proceed-
ings involving environmental matters that are contemplated by gov-
ernmental authorities and what is an administrative proceeding; and
(iii) when is a company required to disclose its policies concerning, or
approach toward, compliance with environmental laws.
Id.
56. Id.
1995]
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trative proceeding."57 In other words, whenever a registrant is in-
volved with an administrative proceeding, it must disclose whether
in fact it or the government initiated the proceeding. Second, the
SEC addressed types of administrative proceedings which result in
required disclosure, limiting them to those proceedings which entail
environmental matters. 8
The final issue addressed in the 1979 release concerned the cir-
cumstances under which public companies must disclose their poli-
cies or approaches concerning environmental compliance.59 The
SEC did not require corporations to disclose their general environ-
mental policy, because such a requirement "would result in subjec-
tive disclosures, largely incapable of verification."' Notwithstand-
ing, the SEC mandated the disclosure of environmental policy in
two instances. First, whenever corporations make voluntary disclo-
sures of environmental policies, those disclosures must be both
accurate and sufficient so as to prevent misleading disclosures.6
Secondly, if a public corporation has an environmental policy
which is reasonably likely to result in substantial fines, penalties,
or other significant effects on the corporation, it may be necessary
for the registrant to disclose the likelihood and magnitude of such
fines, penalties, and other material effects in order to prevent from
being misleading required disclosures with respect to such matters
as descriptions of the corporation's business, financial state-
ments . . . , capital expenditures for environmental compliance or
legal proceedings.62
After administering these guidelines for environmental disclosure
for several years, the SEC began to question its departure from the
traditional economic materiality standard, as well as its disclosure
requirement for all environmental proceedings involving a govern-
mental authority regardless of the proceeding's nature or magni-
tude.63 These expansive disclosure requirements resulted in filings
57. Id. at 82,383.
58. Id. at 82,384.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 82,384.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. See Stephen W. Hamilton, Environmental Disclosure Requirements of the
Securities Exchange Commission, in ENVIRONMENTAL AUDITING HANDBOOK: A
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of many economically inconsequential environmental events, and
tended to obscure more significant environmental matters.64 While
the SEC never agreed to revert entirely to a traditional materiality
standard for environmental disclosures, in 1982 the Commission
adopted a compromise approach as part of its integrated disclosure
system embodied in Regulation S-K.65
B. Integration of Environmental Disclosure Requirements Under
Regulation S-K
SEC Regulation S-K, one of the most important disclosure re-
quirement regulations, requires all publicly held companies to make
disclosures relating to potential environmental liability under feder-
al, state, or local laws.66 In 1982, the SEC adopted Regulation
S-K as part of a system of disclosure regulations designed to inte-
grate and simplify the numerous and complicated disclosures re-
quired under the Exchange Act and the Securities Act.67 The inte-
grated disclosure system was intended to revise or eliminate over-
lapping or unnecessary disclosure and dissemination require-
ments.68 In particular, Regulation S-K governs disclosure require-
ments for public companies.6 9 Ultimately, Regulation S-K was
intended to reduce the burdens on registrants while at the same
time ensuring that security holders, investors, and the marketplace
GUIDE TO CORPORATE AND ENVIRONMENTAL RISK MANAGEMENT 2-109, 2-109
to 2-110 (1995).
64. Id.
65. Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229 (1991).
66. Id.
67. Adoption of Integrated Disclosure System, Securities Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 33-6383, SEC Docket No. 1262 (Mar. 3, 1982) (codified as 17 C.F.R.
§ 229 (1991)).
68. Id.
69. Id. Regulation S-K states in pertinent part:
A publicly held company is defined under the federal securities law as
including (1) a company which has securities listed on a national
securities exchange, (2) a company with total assets exceeding $1
million and 500 or more stockholders, or (3) a company whose regis-
tration statement became effective under the 1933 Act and which has
300 or more stockholders.
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were provided with meaningful information upon which to base
investment decisions." To achieve this goal in the environmental
arena, the SEC set out two specific rules under Regulation S-K
which directly govern environmental reporting requirements: Item
101 and Item 103."'
1. Item 101 Disclosure
The first express reference to environmental disclosure is con-
tained in Item 101 of Regulation S-K, which specifically requires
disclosure
[of] the material effects that compliance with Federal, State and
local provisions which have been enacted or adopted regulating
the discharge of materials into the environment, or otherwise relat-
ing to the protection of the environment, may have upon the capi-
tal expenditures, earnings and competitive position of the registrant
and its subsidiaries.72
The registrant must also disclose "any material estimated capital
expenditures for environmental control facilities for the remainder
of its current fiscal year and its succeeding fiscal year and for such
further periods as the registrant may deem material."73 This pro-
vision essentially codified the rules adopted by the SEC in its 1979
release.74
2. Item 103 Disclosure
The second express reference to environmental disclosure is
contained in Item 103 of Regulation S-K, which requires a descrip-
tion of "any material pending legal proceedings, other than ordinary
routine litigation incidental to the business, to which the registrant
or any of its subsidiaries is a party or of which any of their proper-
70. Id.
71. Regulation S-K, Item 101, (c)(1)(xii), 17 C.F.R. § 229.101 (1991)
[hereinafter "Item 101"]; Regulation S-K, Item 103, Instruction 5, 17 C.F.R.
§ 229.103 (1991) [hereinafter "Item 103"].
72. Item 101, supra note 71.
73. Id.
74. See Environmental Disclosure Requirements, Securities Exchange Act
Release No. 33-6130 and 34-1622, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 23,507B (Sept. 27,
1979).
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ty is the subject."75 Item 103 modified prior disclosure require-
ments by establishing objective thresholds for disclosing environ-
mental proceedings including those in which the government is
seeking "monetary sanction."76
The question of what constitutes a "sanction" remains the subject
of much debate." In a 1989 no-action letter, the SEC took the po-
sition that "costs incurred pursuant to a remedial agreement entered
into in the normal course of negotiation with the EPA will not be
viewed as a sanction."78 The SEC staff pointed out, however, that
although these costs may not be reportable as "sanctions," they may
be reportable under Item 101 or Item 103, if it is reasonably likely
that these costs will be material.7 9
The SEC also has taken the position that "designation as a poten-
tially responsible party (PRP) under CERCLA does not in and of it-
self trigger disclosure under Item 103 because PRP status alone
does not provide knowledge that a governmental agency is contem-
plating a proceeding."' It is worthwhile to note, however, that this
SEC release added that a reporting company's "particular circum-
stances," in combination with PRP status, may provide knowledge
of a contemplated proceeding.8
75. 17 C.F.R. § 229.103 (1991).
76. Specifically, Item 103 requires disclosure of environmental proceedings
when (1) the proceeding (whether governmental or not) is material to the busi-
ness or financial condition of the company; (2) the proceeding involves a poten-
tial monetary loss exceeding ten percent of current assets of the company; or (3)
the proceeding is brought by the government seeking a monetary sanction, unless
the company reasonably believes that the proceeding will result in fines of less
than $100,000. Id.
77. Mary 0. Hylton, Socially Responsible Investing: Doing Good Versus
Doing Well in an Inefficient Market, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 2 (1992); John
Holusha, Environmentalists Assess Corporate Pollution Records, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 9, 1991, at Dl; Barbara Benham, SEC Intensifies Focus on Review of Firms
Environmental Liability, INVESTORS DAILY, Sept. 24, 1990, at 28; Glass Geltman,
supra note 12, at 339.
78. Sidley & Austin, SEC No-Action Letters, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
78,962 (Mar. 29, 1989).
79. Id. at 78,815.
80. Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Re-
sults of Operations: Certain Investment Company Disclosure, Securities Exchange
Act Release No. 26,831, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 62,844 n.17 (June 7, 1989).
81. Id.
1995]
90 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. VII
Questions such as what constitutes a sanction, what is material,
and what the appropriate scope is for disclosure of environmental
liabilities have, not surprisingly, resulted in legal battles. Neither
the SEC regulations nor releases discussed previously provide a
private right of action. Accordingly, much of the litigation sur-
rounding ELD's has taken place under Rule lOb-5.82
II. RULE 1OB-5 CASE LAW
A primary purpose of the federal securities laws is to promote
disclosure of the nature and quality of securities to investors. 3 Pri-
or to the enactment of comprehensive environmental legislation,
federal securities laws did not expressly provide guidance for the
disclosure of contingent environmental liabilities. The Exchange
Act prohibited public registrants from making fraudulent statements
or from omitting material facts.84 Accordingly, in certain instances,
public registrants that failed to adequately disclose contingent envi-
ronmental liabilities were subject to liability under the Securities
Laws.
Once the necessary elements of a Rule lOb-5 8" cause of action
are established, parties may be held liable for misrepresentation or
omission of a material fact. 6 Over the years, a body of case law
has defined the scope of Rule lOb-5 and, in the process, has creat-
ed a potentially effective weapon for private as well as public en-
forcement of environmental disclosure standards.87 Although appli-
82. Rule lOb-5, supra note 13.
83. See generally Isquith v. Middle South Utilities, Inc., 847 F.2d 186 (5th
Cir. 1988); Lipton v. Documation, Inc., 734 F.2d 740 (11th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1132 (1985); In re LTV Securities Litigation, 88 F.R.D. 134,
144 (N.D. Tex. 1980).
84. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-7811.
85. Rule lOb-5, supra note 13. Rule lOb-5 sets out the following necessary
elements for a private cause of action: (1) a material misrepresentation, omission,
deception, or manipulation; (2) scienter; (3) intent to deceive, manipulate, or
defraud the plaintiff; and (4) causation. Id.
86. See, e.g., Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980); Chiarella v. United States,
445 U.S. 222, 235 (1980) (The Supreme Court stated that parties may be held
liable for misrepresenting or omitting a material fact.); Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun
Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033 (7th Cir. 1977); Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974); SEC v. Musella, 578 F.
Supp. 425 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
87. See generally Perry E. Wallace, Disclosure of Environmental Liabilities
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cation of Rule lOb-5 to securities disclosure issues has fueled great
debate among commentators, there have been very few SEC admin-
istrative proceedings or cases concerning the enforcement of the
environmental disclosure requirements." Thus, the courts have
only begun to develop clear standards for determining when a cor-
poration may be liable for securities fraud based upon its failure to
disclose environmental liabilities.8
A. Evolution of 10b-5 Case Law
In Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., the Eastern District Court of
Pennsylvania held that Rule lOb-5 afforded injured parties an im-
plied private right of action.90 The court in Kardon also pro-
nounced that instances of securities fraud involving private as well
as public companies may be included in the scope of Rule
l0b-5.91 Following the Kardon decision, private litigants employed
Rule lOb-5 to avail themselves of its expansive scope and jurisdic-
tional advantages.92 Beginning in the mid-1970s, however, the
Under the Securities Laws: The Potential of Securities-Market-Based Incentives
for Pollution Control, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1093 (1993); Note, Recklessness
and the Rule 10b-5 Scienter Standard After Hochfelder, FORDHAM L. REv. 817
(1980); Elaine E. Bucklo, The Supreme Court Attempts to Define Scienter Under
Rule 10b-5: Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 29 STAN. L. REv. 213 (1977).
88. See, e.g., In re Occidental Petroleum Corp., Securities Exchange Act
Release No. 16,950 [1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) §§ 82,622,
83,347-348 (July 2, 1980). For a case interpreting the application of Rule lOb-5
to environmental disclosure, see Levine v. NL Industries, 926 F.2d 199 (2d Cir.
1991) (holding no duty to disclose because registrant was not exposed to potential
environmental liabilities). The use of Rule lOb-5 to enforce ELDs is discussed
further infra part II.B.
89. See Note, Environmental Disclosures and SEC Reporting Requirements,
17 DEL. J. CORP. L. 483 (1992).
90. 73 F. Supp. 798, 800-02 (1947) (derivative action by shareholders to
recover damages from officers for fraudulently conspiring to induce plaintiffs to
sell their stock in two corporations for less than its true value).
91. See generally Kardon, 73 F. Supp. 798 (discussing the closely held corpo-
ration whose stock was at the source of the controversy).
92. See, e.g., Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970); St. Louis
Union Trust Co. v. Merrill Lynch, Inc., 562 F.2d 1040 (8th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 925 (1978); Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1053 (1977); Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507
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Supreme Court began a process of narrowing Rule lOb-5's applica-
bility.93 Its rationale for this shift was largely due to the "danger
of vexatiousness" that accompanies litigation under Rule lOb-5.
94
One common-law fraud element that has been incorporated into
Rule lOb-5 actions is the concept of materiality. Because materiali-
ty, in some form or another, is often critical in deciding whether
there is a duty to disclose under the securities laws, its precise defi-
nition is of great importance. 9 Simply put, materiality refers to
that point at which information becomes so significant that it will
be considered legally ripe for disclosure. 96
In March 1988, the Supreme Court issued a unanimous decision
in Basic, Inc. v. Levinson,97 that adopted a general test for deter-
mining the materiality of merger negotiations in actions brought
F.2d 374 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 976 (1975).
93. See Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 473-74 (1977) (expanding
Ernst & Ernst by requiring that plaintiffs seeking redress under Rule lob-5 must
allege "manipulative or deceptive" facts or transactions); Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193-94 n.12 (1976) (further limiting Rule lOb-5's
scope by imposing a scienter requirement which was defined as a "mental state
embracing intent to deceive, manipulate or defraud"); Blue Chip Stamps v. Man-
or Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 749 (1975) (holding that only plaintiffs who had
purchased or sold the securities in question during the period of the alleged fraud
could assert claims for damages based on Rule lOb-5); Lipton v. Documation,
Inc., 734 F.2d 740 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1132 (1985); Shores
v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 594 U.S. 1102 (1983).
94. Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 739-40. The Court feared that private
litigants would take advantage of Rule lOb-5's permissive scope and force com-
panies into endless litigation battles. Id.
95. See generally Andrew L. Merritt, A Consistent Model of Loss Causation
in Securities Fraud Litigation: Suiting the Remedy to the Wrong, 66 TEx. L. REV.
469 (1988); Note, The Reliance Requirement in Private Actions Under SEC Rule
10b-5, 88 HARV. L. REV. 584 (1975); Note, Reliance Under Rule 10b-5: Is the
"Reasonable Investor" Reasonable?, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 562 (1972).
96. See, e.g., Flynn v. Bass Bros. Enterprises, Inc., 744 F.2d 978, 984 (3d Cir.
1984) ("[w]here a duty to speak exists .... federal securities law requires the
disclosure of any material fact . . . ."). This quote emphasizes the importance of
identifying when a person is under a duty to speak and what information is mate-
rial and therefore must be included in the statement once the duty to speak has
been triggered. Id.
97. 485 U.S. 224 (1988). Three justices - Rehnquist, Scalia and Kennedy -
did not participate in the decision.
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under Rule 10b-5. The test applied by the Court requires consider-
ation of the "probability" that the merger will occur in the light of
the potential "significance" or "magnitude" of the occurrence.9"
Although the test does not specifically deal with environmental
disclosure, the Court's opinion provides important insight into the
meaning and application of its test to the environmental arena.
In Basic, representatives from a competing firm, Combustion
Engineering, initiated a series of meetings and conversations with
the officers and directors of the defendant concerning the possibility
of a merger in September 1976. 9 Over two years later, the discus-
sions proved fruitful."° On December 18, 1978, Basic requested a
trading halt from the New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE") and
announced it had been approached by another company concerning
a merger.' Prior to this announcement, Basic denied on numer-
ous occasions that negotiations were taking place. 2 On Decem-
ber 20, Basic's board announced it had endorsed a tender offer by
Combustion for all of Basic's outstanding common stock at forty-
six dollars per share.0 3
Certain shareholders brought a class action against Basic and its
board of directors for alleged violations of Rule 10b-5.43  The
shareholders had sold Basic stock, prior to the December 1978
announcement, under the impression that no merger negotiations
were taking place. 5 Plaintiffs charged that three statements is-
sued by Basic between October 21, 1977 and November 6, 1978
were false and misleading." The district court certified the class
98. Id. at 239-40. The Court remanded for a determination of whether summa-
ry judgment, which had been granted to the petitioners by the district court, was
appropriate in light of this test. Id.
99. Id. at 227.
100. Id. at 227-28.
101. Id. at 228.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. The first statement, published on October 21, 1977, in a local newspa-
per denied that any negotiations for a merger were occurring. Id. The second
statement, issued September 25, 1978, responding to a New York Stock Ex-
change request, denied any pending company merger. Id. The third statement,
issued in the shareholder report on November 6, 1978, was a typical "no corpo-
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action, 17 but granted summary judgment for the defendants, hold-
ing that as a matter of law the three statements at issue were not
false or misleading since the corporate events preceding them were
immaterial.0 8
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the class
certification but reversed the grant of summary judgment, finding
that all three statements were misleading."° As to whether the
statements were materially misleading, and thus actionable, the
court held that a statement denying the existence of discussions
renders otherwise immaterial discussions material because such
other discussions cause the statement of denial to be "untrue.'" °
This standard set by the Sixth Circuit was at odds with the mate-
riality standard previously adopted by the Third and Seventh Cir-
cuits. Under the materiality standard in the Third and Seventh Cir-
cuits, merger discussions were not material until an "agree-
ment-in-principle" had been reached.1" Based on this conflict,
the Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide the legal standard
for determining the materiality threshold for merger discussions
under Rule lOb-5. 1 2
The petitioner, Basic, asked the Court to adopt the agree-
ment-in-principle test followed by the Third and Seventh Cir-
rate developments" statements. Id. See also Bruce A. Hiler, Basic, Inc. v.
Levinson: The Supreme Court's Opinion on Disclosure of Merger Discussions in
Theory and Practice, at 1051, 1052 (PLI Course Handbook Series No. 613,
1988).
107. Basic, 485 U.S. at 228 n.17.
108. Id. at 229; Levinson v. Basic, Inc., New Court Decisions, [1984-85 Trans-
fer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 9191,801, at 90,028, 90,042-044 (Aug. 3,
1984). The district court found that the events preceding the first statement were
not even preliminary merger negotiations and that, in fact, "merger negotiations"
occurred only beginning on December 15, 1978. Id. at 90,028.
109. Levinson v. Basic, Inc., 786 F.2d 741 (6th Cir. 1986).
110. Id. at 749.
111. See Flamm v. Eberstadt, 814 F.2d 1169, 1174 (7th Cir. 1987) (adopting
agreement-in-principle test and requiring agreement on "price and structure");
Greenfield v. Heublein, Inc., 742 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
1215 (1985); Staffin v. Greenberg, 672 F.2d 1196, 1207 (3d Cir. 1982) (holding
that the duty to disclose the existence of merger negotiations is triggered when
agreement-in-principle is reached).
112. Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
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cuits." '3 Instead of following either the Sixth Circuit or the Third
and Seventh Circuits' standards, the Court opted for the general
standard enunciated in TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway."4 The
TSC Industries standard is used to determine whether the omission
of a fact from proxy materials is material and thereby violates Rule
14a-9 of the Exchange Act,"' which prohibits false or misleading
statements in a proxy contest." 6 In TSC Industries, the Court held
that an omitted fact is material under Rule 14a-9, "if there [is] a
substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact would
have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly
altered the 'total mix' of information made available."" 7
When the Court accepted this standard as the basis for judging
the materiality of merger discussions under Rule lOb-5 in Basic,
only an aberrational reading of TSC Industries could have allowed
the adoption of the agreement-in-principle test. ' 8 Ultimately, the
113. Id. at 232-33. Three policy arguments were advanced to support such a
bright-line test: (1) earlier disclosure of necessarily uncertain merger discussions
could mislead investors by fostering false optimism; (2) earlier disclosure could
not adequately preserve the confidentiality in such discussions and may jeopar-
dize the negotiations; and (3) the agreement-in-principle test provides certainty
for management, which otherwise would be forced to make difficult disclosure
judgments, often times subjecting it to enormous civil liability for inaccurate or
incomplete disclosure. Id. at 233.
114. 426 U.S. 438 (1976).
115. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1995) [hereinafter "Rule 14a-9"].
116. Rule 14a-9 provides, in relevant part:
No solicitation subject to this regulation shall be made by means of
any proxy statement, form or proxy, notice of meeting or other com-
munication, written or oral, containing any statement which, at the
time and in the light of the circumstances under which it is made, is
false or misleading with respect to any material fact, or which omits
to state any material fact necessary in order to make the statements
therein not false or misleading or necessary to correct any statement
in any earlier communication with respect to the solicitation of a
proxy for the same meeting or subject matter which has become false
or misleading.
Id.
117. TSC Industries, 426 U.S. at 449.
118. Hiler, supra note 106, at 1051. Because the TSC Industries standard of
materiality is grounded on the reasonable investor's view of the total information,
it would be stilted to claim that a reasonable investor would or could only be
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TSC Industries standard hinges on the eyes of the "reasonable in-
vestor," without a doubt an investor-oriented standard.119 This
type of analysis requires fact-specific review of all the information
available to determine whether the excluded information would
significantly alter the reasonable investor's decision-making pro-
cess. On its face, the rigid agreement-in-principle test advanced by
the petitioner would not allow such a fact-sensitive analysis. 2 '
The Basic Court's unequivocal acceptance of the rationale of TSC
Industries allowed for easy disposal of the agreement-in-principle
test. The reasonable investor test necessitates a case-by-case analy-
sis of "the probability that the transaction will be consummated,
and its significance to the issuer of the securities."' 2 The role of
the materiality requirement, however, is not to "'attribute to inves-
tors a child-like simplicity, an inability to grasp the probabilistic
significance of negotiations' but to filter out" insignificant informa-
tion that an investor would ultimately disregard in making an in-
vestment decision.'22 This language serves to underscore one of
the foremost objectives of the securities regulatory system, that of
influenced at the point of "agreement-in-principle."
119. TSC Industries, 426 U.S. at 449. "The question of materiality, it is uni-
versally agreed, is an objective one, involving the significance of an omitted or
misrepresented fact to a reasonable investor." Id. at 445.
120. Id. The TSC Industries standard adopted by the Court in Basic was based
upon the policies of the Exchange Act to "protect investors against manipulation
of stock prices," to promote "honest publicity" and "honest markets" and to im-
plement the "full disclosure" policy of the Act. Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S.
224, 230 (1988). See also Hiler, supra note 106, at 1051.
121. Basic, 485 U.S. at 225. This test is virtually identical to the test outlined
by the Second Circuit in the Texas Gulf Sulphur case, where it considered the
materiality of a contingent event in the context of an insider trading scheme. See
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert.
denied sub. nom. Coates v. SEC, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). The Second Circuit held
that when dealing with future-oriented information, materiality requires a balanc-
ing of the "indicated probability that the event will occur and the anticipated
magnitude of the event in light of the totality of the company activity." Id. at
849; see also SEC v. Davis [Current Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) H 93,696
(S.D. Ohio 1988) (Basic test requires a "balancing of the indicated probability
that the merger will occur and the anticipated magnitude of the merger in light of
the totality of the company activity.").
122. Basic, 485 U.S. at 234 (quoting Flamm v. Eberstandt, 814 F.2d 1169,
1175 (7th Cir. 1987)).
DISCLOSURE STANDARDS
the fully knowledgeable investor."
Given that environmental liabilities are usually "contingent or
speculative in nature,"'24 the examination of the probability and
the magnitude of the materiality appears to be particularly appli-
cable to environmental disclosure cases. Environmental cases fre-
quently involve assessing the probability of environmental harm as
well as examining the magnitude of environmental liabilities and
corresponding obligations. 5  The probability/magnitude test
adopted in Basic enables Rule lOb-5 to be used as a weapon
against securities fraud involving inadequate environmental disclo-
sure. It further appears that the probability/magnitude test may re-
quire very little in the way of probability before merger discussions
become material.'26 Thus, similarly, an environmental liability
need not be exceedingly probable before materiality is triggered and
disclosure required.
B. Uses of Rule 1Ob-5 for Environmental Liability Disclosures
At present a dearth of cases have invoked Rule lOb-5 for mis-
leading statements made on environmental matters, but the material
nature of environmental issues seems naturally inclined to yield
fertile grounds for attack.' The leading case in the field is Le-
vine v. NL Industries,'28 in which the plaintiff, Levine, brought a
class action against NL Industries, Inc. ("NL"), a NYSE listed
public company, alleging the defendant's violation of Rule
lOb-5.'29 Levine claimed that NL failed to disclose in its SEC
reports that its wholly owned subsidiary was operating in violation
of state and federal environmental laws.3 Consequently, NL was
subject to significant liability. 3' Levine argued that NL had a du-
123. See Hiler, supra note 106, at 1054.
124. Id.
125. See Wallace, supra note 87, at 1118.
126. See Hiler, supra note 106, at 1057.
127. Id. at 1057-58.
128. 717 F. Supp. 252 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), affd, 926 F.2d 199 (2d Cir. 1991)
(holding that because NL was indemnified for all expenses under its operating
agreement with the Department of Energy, its failure to disclose environmental
violations was immaterial).
129. Id. at 252.
130. Id. at 253.
131. Id. The NL subsidiary operated a uranium processing plant that was
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ty to disclose the alleged failure to comply with environmental laws
under the specific disclosure requirements relating to environmental
matters and that the failure to disclose rendered other statements in
NL's SEC filing misleading.'32 NL claimed that it made specific
disclosures required on the Annual Form 10-K and that any omis-
sions were immaterial.
133
In granting NL's motion for summary judgment, 134 instead of
applying Rule lOb-5 the court determined that neither of the S-K
regulations, Item 101 nor Item 103, by their terms mandated disclo-
sure that the NL subsidiary was operating the processing plant in
violation of applicable laws. 135 The defendant's position in this
case was bolstered substantially because it operated a government
plant on a cost-reimbursement basis and the subsidiary was only a
small part of NL's overall operations. 136 The court's reasoning
owned by the Department of Energy ("DOE"). The subsidiary's performance of
the contract with the DOE was guaranteed by NL. Revenues from the
subsidiary's operations were never more than .2% of NL's annual gross revenue.
Within the class period for this litigation, there was an accidental emission of
uranium dust at the plant. Consequently, surrounding landowners and residents
brought an action for damages. In addition, the state brought an action seeking
costs, damages and penalties for alleged environmental violations. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 254.
134. Id. at 253. The court characterized the action as a fraudulent omission
claim. Id.
135. Id. at 254-55. Additionally, the court found an Item 101 disclosure inap-
plicable in NL's situation because its subsidiary's contract with the government
provided for reimbursement of all expenses that the subsidiary would incur in
complying with environmental laws. As a result, NL's capital expenditures or
earning could not be materially affected by compliance with environmental laws.
The court further found Item 101 inapplicable because it dealt with the effect that
environmental compliance had on a company's capital expenditures, earning and
competitive position, not the effect of the noncompliance. Id. at 255. Item 103
was inapplicable because it is only triggered upon a pending legal proceedings,
which there was not at the time of the disclosures at issue. For a discussion of
the S-K regulations, Item 101 and Item 103, see supra part I.
136. Levine, 717 F. Supp. at 255. While a subsidiary may only be a small part
of the consolidated operations, the penalties and damages arising from non-com-
pliance with environmental laws can very quickly become material, assuming that
there is no government indemnification on a cost-reimbursement basis as there
was in the case of NL. Id.
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confirms the difficulty of stretching specific disclosure requirements
to accommodate an attack on a generalized disclosure.'37
Both the specific and implied disclosure requirements discussed
above require a fact-intensive analysis of a particular matter before
a company can determine if disclosure of an existing or potential
environmental liability is required. The magnitude of a company's
potential exposure from environmental matters, particularly under
Superfund, will require companies making materiality determina-
tions to focus carefully on the probability of environmental liability
when determining disclosures in light of the Basic reasonable inves-
tor and probability/magnitude standards.'38 With contingent envi-
ronmental liabilities, a public company can be faced with the unap-
pealing alternatives of not disclosing a liability, thereby potentially
subjecting itself to securities law claims, or making disclosures
which result in previously unasserted environmental liabilities. How
the SEC responds to the enforcement of SAB 92 may provide an
answer to this dilemma.
III. SAB 92
Past uncertainty over the best way to characterize the wide range
of possible liability exposures have led companies not to provide
or, at best, to provide vague estimates of their potential environ-
mental liability.'39 In a 1993 Price Waterhouse survey, sixty-two
percent of 523 companies surveyed indicated that they did not
record known environmental exposures in their financial state-
ments. " Concern over this lack of disclosure prompted the SEC
to require more detailed and comprehensive reporting of
corporations' existing or potential environmental liabilities. 4'
These efforts focused upon the related issues of Regulation S-K
corporation disclosure and the accounting of environmental liabil-
137. Id.
138. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
139. Lee Berton, SEC Rule Forces More Disclosure, WALL ST. J., Dec. 13,
1993, at BI.
140. Id.
141. Jay K. Wright, Quantifying Environmental Exposure: Another Battle-
ground For Accountant's Liability?, in Accountants' Liability 1994, at 241 (PLI
Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. H4-5203, 1994).
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ities. 4 Accordingly, the SEC moved to require that S-K corpora-
tions substantially broaden current environmental disclosure and
accounting practices.
SAB 92,141 published by the SEC in August 1993, provides a
clear indication that S-K corporation disclosure and accounting of
environmental loss contingencies will be subject to stricter stan-
dards for the timely and comprehensive disclosure of environmental
liabilities.'" Implicit in the SEC's SAB 92 accounting and disclo-
sure requirements is the view that
[e]nvironmental liabilities typically are of such significance that
detailed disclosures regarding the judgments and assumptions un-
derlying the recognition and measurement of these liabilities are
necessary to prevent a reporting company's financial statements
from being misleading and to inform readers fully regarding the
range of reasonably possible outcomes that could have a material
effect on the registrant's financial condition, results of operations,
or liquidity.'45
A. SAB 92's Specific Holdings
Generally, SAB 92 presents SEC views in three areas: (1) what
constitutes proper disclosure of contingent liabilities and related
assets representing claims for recovery within financial statements;
(2) what is the proper discount rate to be applied in reflecting the
time value of money of a contingent liability presented at its pres-
142. Id.
143. 58 Fed. Reg. 32,843 (1993).
144. Id. at 32,845. For example, SAB 92 requires disclosure if:
A registrant believes it may be obligated to pay material amounts as a
result of... environmental liability. These amounts may relate to, for
example, damages attributed to the registrant's products or processes,
clean-up of hazardous wastes, reclamation costs, fines, and litigation
costs. The registrant may seek to recover a portion or all of these
amounts by filing a claim against an insurance carrier or other third
parties.
Id. at 32,843. See also infra part III.A.
145. SAB 92, supra note 143, at 32,845. But cf Schwartz, supra note 32, at
316 (discussing disclosure of actual and contingent environmental liabilities by
publicly reporting companies and concluding that there are no bright line tests
respecting disclosure of environmental liabilities).
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ent value; and (3) which disclosures are likely to be of particular
significance to investors assessing these contingencies." Specifi-
cally, SAB 92 asks and provides answers to eight questions re-
garding environmental liability reporting on S-K corporation bal-
ance sheets. 7
The first question asks whether it is appropriate to offset a claim
for recovery that will probably be realized against a probable con-
tingent liability, resulting in a single net amount to be reported on
the balance sheet." The SEC response is that generally such a
consolidation of figures is inappropriate. 49 SAB 92 notes that the
significant uncertainties regarding both the timing and the ultimate
realization of claims, as well as a general proscription of the offset-
ting of assets and liabilities except where a right of set-off exists,
militate against the netting of these figures.150
The second question posits a situation in which a corporation is
jointly and severally liable as a potentially responsible party
("PRP") under CERCLA and asks whether, given a reasonable
basis for apportionment of costs among all PRPs involved in the
site, the registrant must recognize a liability with respect to costs
apportioned to other PRPs.'5 ' The SEC's reply is a qualified
"no. ifl The SEC staff noted that if it were probable that other
PRPs would not fully pay their apportioned share of costs, the
registrant should not offset its recognized liability by amounts ap-
portioned to other PRPs and should reflect all additional costs the
registrant expects to pay."' In addition, the staff's commentary on
question two suggests that the registrant's disclosure statement
should discuss uncertainties affecting the ultimate liabilities and
additional losses that are reasonably possible. 4
The third question addresses disparities between estimates of
146. See Wright, supra note 141, at 246.
147. See generally SAB 92, supra note 143.
148. Id. at 32,844.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
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liability, related costs and the actual figure.'55 The SEC staff stat-
ed that registrants should base estimates "on currently available
facts, existing technology, and presently enacted laws and regula-
tions."'56 In addition, registrants should consider the likely effects
of inflation and societal and economic factors.'57 SAB 92 express-
ly prohibits corporations from delaying recognition of contingent
liabilities until a single amount can be reasonably estimated.'
Under SAB 92, if the registrant can only determine a range within
which its liability will fall, it should disclose the minimum amount
of the range.'59 Interestingly, the SEC acknowledged the difficulty
that corporations face in making an estimate before the full range
of the problem is known."6 The SEC suggested that "registrant[s]
consider available evidence including the registrant's prior experi-
ence in remediation of contaminated sites, other companies'
clean-up experiences, and data released by the EPA or other orga-
nizations."''
The fourth question addresses environmental liability discounting
to reflect the "time value of money."' 2 SAB 92 states that if the
aggregate amount of the obligation and the time and amount of
payments are fixed or reliably determinable for a specific site, dis-
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. The efficacy of the SEC's specific prohibition against this delay was
demonstrated in an October 2, 1994, letter to the editor of the New York Times
Financial Desk. Evelyn Berezin, The Importance of Being Open, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 2, 1994, at C9. Ms. Berezin discussed her struggle, while on the board of
directors of Koppers Company, a manufacturer of coal-tar derivatives, to provide
shareholders with information about the company's substantial environmental
obligations. She wrote that she was consistently overruled on the grounds that
"until we [Koppers] had really investigated and had hard estimates of the cost to
clean up each site, it was not an acceptable accounting practice to make such in-
formation public." Id. Ms. Berezin concluded that the corporation subsequently
underwent a hostile takeover. The overtaking corporation was itself subsequently
purchased, a fact that Ms. Berezin attributed in large part to the environmental
liabilities which Koppers faced. Id.
159. SAB 92, supra note 143, at 32,844.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
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counting is appropriate.163 The SEC also states that the discount
rate should be the rate that will produce an amount at which the
environmental liability could be settled in an arm's-length transac-
tion with a third party."
The fifth question outlines the financial statement disclosures that
corporations should furnish regarding recorded and unrecorded en-
vironmental liabilities.'65 SAB 92 expresses the staff's belief that
environmental liabilities are typically of such great significance that
detailed disclosures regarding judgments and assumptions underly-
ing recognition and measurement of liabilities would be required to
prevent financial statements from being misleading." Further,
these disclosures are necessary to fully inform readers regarding the
range of reasonably possible outcomes that could have a material
effect on the corporation's financial condition, the results of opera-
tions, or its liquidity. 7 SAB 92 then presents eight examples of
necessary disclosures:
1. Circumstances affecting the reliability and precision of loss
estimates.
2. The extent to which unasserted claims are reflected in any
accrual or may affect the magnitude of the contingency.
3. Uncertainties with respect to joint and several liability that
may affect the magnitude of the contingency, including disclosure
of the aggregate expected cost to remediate particular sites that are
individually material if the likelihood of contribution by the other
significant parties has not been established.
4. Disclosure of the nature and terms of cost-sharing arrange-
ments with other [PRPs].
5. The extent to which disclosed but unrecognized contingent
losses are expected to be recoverable through insurance, indemnifi-
cation arrangements, or other sources, with disclosure of any mate-
rial limitations of that recovery.
6. Uncertainties regarding the legal sufficiency of insurance
claims or solvency of insurance carriers.
7. The time frame over which the accrued or presently unrecog-
163. Id. at 32,845.
164. Id. at 32,844-845.
165. Id. at 32,845.
166. Id.; see also Stephen C. Blowers and Sharon Z. Chevalier, Accounting
Disclosures Relating to Loss Contingencies, INSIGHTS, Dec. 1993, at 31.
167. SAB 92, supra note 143, at 32,845.
1995] 103
104 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. VII
nized amounts may be paid out.
8. Material components of the accruals and significant assump-
tions underlying estimates."6
The staff's response to question five is particularly noteworthy
for its delineation of disclosures protected or unprotected by a "safe
harbor" provision within the Securities Act.' 69 Civil liability aris-
ing from false or misleading statements is governed, in part, by
section 77(k) of the Securities Act. 70 Section 77(k) indicates that
the standard of reasonableness "shall be that required of a prudent
man in the management of his own property."' 7' The Securities
Act's reasonableness standard places qualified disclosures within a
"safe harbor."' SAB 92 curtails the application of the "safe har-
bor" provision to environmental liability disclosures.'
Question six discusses the disclosure of loss contingencies that
may be necessary outside of the financial statements previously
discussed. Regarding this subject, the SEC staff directed registrants
to other SEC regulations and interpretive releases.' 4 SAB 92 also
168. Id.
169. Id.; 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa.
170. Id. § 77k.
171. Id. § 77k(c).
172. 17 C.F.R. § 230.175(a) (1992) [hereinafter "Rule 175(a)"]. Rule 175(a)
was promulgated pursuant to the Securities Act and reads in pertinent part:
A statement within the coverage of paragraph (b) of this section
which is made by or on behalf of an issuer or by an outside reviewer
retained by the issuer shall be deemed not to be a fraudulent statement
(as defined in paragraph (d) of this section), unless it is shown that
such statement was made or reaffirmed without a reasonable basis or
was disclosed other than in good faith.
Id.; see Wielgos v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 892 F.2d 509, 512-13 (7th Cir.
1989). In Wielgos, the Seventh Circuit affirmed a district court's ruling that an
electrical utility's incorporation of erroneous statements into prospectus fell
within a "safe harbor" rule for "forward-looking statements" thereby preclud-
ing a finding of securities fraud liability. The electric utility's statements dealt
with the estimated cost and start-up times of nuclear reactors. Id.
173. The SEC's response to the fifth question is noteworthy for its specificity
in discussing situations which fall outside of the Rule 175(a) "safe harbor". Prior
to SAB 92, because the limits of the "safe harbor" were not clearly delineated,
corporations often delayed disclosure of specific environmental liability figures
until a highly reliable figure could be reported.
174. SAB 92, supra note 143, at 32,845.
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suggested that disclosures made pursuant to these provisions should
be specific enough to enable registrants to understand the scope of
the contingency, including recurring hazardous substance manage-
ment and pollution costs, capital expenditures to limit or monitor
pollutants and hazardous substances, mandated expenditures to
remediate previously contaminated sites, and anticipated
non-recurring or infrequent clean-up expenditures (but which are
not presently required).'
Question seven deals with disclosures regarding site restoration or
other environmental exit costs. 76 SAB 92 indicates that registrants
should disclose material liabilities that occur due to the sale, dis-
posal, or abandonment of a property in the notes to the financial
statements. 77 It further states that appropriate disclosure will gen-
erally "include the nature of the costs involved, the total anticipated
cost, the total costs accrued to date, the balance sheet classification
of accrued amounts, and the range or amount of reasonably possible
additional losses.' 7'  Disclosure of expenditures required for
remediation of a site before development, before sale, subsequent to
a sale, or as a condition of sale should be made in a note to the
financial statements unless the likelihood of a material unfavorable
outcome is remote.
79
The eighth and final question addresses a situation in which site
restoration costs, post-closure costs, monitoring costs, or other
environmental exit costs are anticipated at the end of the useful life
of an asset.' SAB 92 indicates that these costs may be accrued
over the useful life of the asset provided that the criteria in para-
graph eight of Staff Financial Accounting Standards No. 5 ("SFAS
5") are met."'
SAB 92 expressly requires that registrants quantify future lia-
175. Id.
176. Id. at 32,845-846.
177. Id. at 32,846.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. Paragraph 8 of SFAS 5 states that an estimated loss from a loss con-
tingency shall be accrued by a charge to income if it is probable that a liability
has been incurred and the amount of the loss can be reasonably estimated. Staff
Financial Accounting Standards No. 5, 1993 WL 194317, at *1.
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bilities.8 2 Previously, companies justified their failure to recog-
nize "probable" liability by claiming such liability was not "rea-
sonably estimable." The SEC hopes to close this loophole through
the practices outlined in SAB 92. If a loss is probable, a company
is expected to accumulate sufficient reliable information in making
an estimate to recognize and disclose its minimum best estimate of
the loss.183
For example, disclosure of a registrant's historical and anticipated
environmental expenditures should separately describe the following
material: (1) recurring costs associated with managing hazardous
substances and pollution on ongoing operations; (2) capital expendi-
tures to limit or monitor hazardous substances or pollutants; (3)
mandated expenditures to remediate previously contaminated sites;
and (4) other infrequent or non-recurring clean-up expenditures that
can be anticipated but which are not required in the present circum-
stances. 1
84
These additional disclosure requirements should prevent compa-
nies from taking a wait-and-see approach with their environmental
problems and force some real soul-searching regarding the reporting
of future environmental liabilities. Furthermore, SAB 92 prohibits
the use of possible claims of recovery to offset liabilities.8 5 In
other words, the two should be listed separately as a gross liability
and a claim for recovery.8 6 SAB 92 will also generally stop com-
panies from discounting liabilities to a smaller amount. Such dis-
counting is achieved by calculating how much money, invested to
yield a predicted amount, would be needed today to pay a consider-
ably larger environmental obligation in the future. SAB 92's disal-
lowance of this discounting practice for ELDs has been referred to
by corporate executives as "balance sheet poison."'87
182. SAB 92, supra note 143, at 32,844.
183. Id.
184. Blowers and Chevalier, supra note 166, at 33-34.
185. SAB 92, supra note 143, at 32,844.
186. Id.
187. Berton, supra note 139.
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B. Corporate Responses to SAB 92
Market expectations of unlimited indemnity can have the effect
of discouraging sales of at-risk properties or, alternatively, of dis-
couraging investment in at-risk corporations. 8 Prior to SAB 92,
amorphously delineated disclosure standards allowed great variation
in disclosures of environmental liabilities and thereby avoided the
potential market-related problems. With the release of SAB 92, the
SEC demonstrated greater interest in illuminating the question of
what constitutes adequate disclosure of environmental liabilities.'89
Given the estimated billions of dollars in under-reported or non-re-
ported environmental liabilities, the implications for corporations,
the parties that invest in them, and commerce in general are enor-
mous.
In the past, investors often were surprised by revelations of envi-
ronmental liabilities faced by companies in which they invested."9
An example is Hanson PLC's experience stemming from its 1991
acquisition of Beazer, a British construction company. 9' Prior to
the takeover, Beazer acquired Koppers Company, a Pennsylvania
based producer of wood treatment chemicals, in a $1.8 billion hos-
tile takeover.' 92 Following the acquisition, in 1992, Hanson PLC
set aside £734 million (approximately seventy-five percent of its
1992 profits) in anticipation of previously undisclosed environmen-
tal liability claims from the Beazer/Koppers acquisition 93
Based on situations like that encountered by Hanson PLC, there
clearly existed a need for more detailed disclosures of environmen-
tal liabilities. Initial company reaction to SAB 92, however, has
188. Tom Andreoli, SEC Rule: It Trashes Balance Sheets-Firms Now Must
Book Liability For Pollution, CRAIN'S CHI. Bus., Dec. 19, 1994, at 3 ("The worst
kind of news is bad news waiting to happen, but that's exactly the kind of news
public companies now must provide shareholders by disclosing potential future
environmental liabilities.").
189. Id.
190. See Mike Clancy, AETNA Results Surprise Analysts, Stock Falls,
REUTERS, July 29, 1994, available in LEXIS, CURNWS File (discussing analyst
surprise and stock price fall of approximately 8 percent on news of AETNA's
addition of $64 million to its environmental indemnity-related reserves).
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
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been less than enthusiastic, with some companies arguing that the
SEC's standards are at best unrealistic and at worst unattain-
able.194 These protests are based on the difficulty of estimating
environmental liabilities early in the remediation process. Although
preliminary liability studies can only approximate the amount of
pollution at a site, companies must now provide a best guess esti-
mate of liabilities.'95 Reflecting inherent uncertainties in the scale
of an environmental liability and its remediation cost, ultimate
liabilities can vary greatly from these initial estimates.'96 Compa-
nies and investors must now grapple with these uncertainties, as
environmental liabilities can no longer be dismissed out of hand or
expressed as an afterthought in a footnote.
How companies will specifically be affected by the SEC's stricter
disclosure standards remains to be seen. There is no doubt, howev-
er, that changes in disclosure practices will be required. For exam-
ple, "increased disclosure requirements will particularly affect com-
panies that don't disclose the extent of environmental liabilities
because they believe they [are not] 'material' [liabilities]" under
Rule lOb-5.' 97 Under pre-SAB 92 accounting standards, liabilities
were "material" only if they amounted to more than five percent of
a company's profits or assets.' 98 SAB 92, however, requires that
companies disclose many environmental liabilities even if they fall
below the five percent threshold.' 99 In many cases, these disclo-
sures will surprise investors as previously invisible liabilities sud-
denly appear.
An example of things to come can be found in Rockwell
International's ("Rockwell") recent experience in Colorado. In a
194. Bukro, supra note 24 ("Many corporations are now engaging in some real
soul-searching to estimate what the costs are. A lot of them are saying [that]
what the SEC wants simply can't be done.").
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Berton, supra note 139.
198. Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229 (1991). See Notice of Adoption of
Amendments to Registration and Report Forms to Require Disclosure With Re-
spect to Compliance With Environmental Requirements and Other Matters, Secu-
rities Exchange Act Release No. 5386, 20 Fed. Reg. 12,100 (1973).
199. Richard Y. Roberts & Kurt R. Hohl, Environmental Liability Disclosure
and Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 92, 50 Bus. LAW 1, 11 (1994).
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voluntary report issued along with its normal annual report,
Rockwell told its shareholders that it faced as much as $130 million
in liability for environmental cleanups and fines.2" Rockwell
made this disclosure in anticipation of the SEC's enforcement of
SAB 92.20' The liability was reported as $45 million in costs
stemming from Rockwell's designation as a potentially liable party
at thirty-four EPA Superfund cleanup sites.2'2 The additional $85
million derived "mostly [from] cleanup costs associated with busi-
nesses that were sold in the 1980' S.',213 Rockwell also disclosed
that it had already accrued $72.4 million in anticipation of these
liabilities.2' Taken together, these amounts were far higher than
Rockwell had disclosed in previous years0 5 suggesting that strict-
er disclosure standards will make for interesting corporate revela-
tions in coming years. Interestingly, one year before this disclosure
in 1992, Rockwell paid $18.5 million, the largest environmental
fine in its history, to settle government lawsuits alleging misman-
agement of nuclear wastes at the Rocky Flats, Colorado nuclear
weapons plant it managed for the Department of Energy.2"
For many corporations, even when estimates of environmental
liabilities have not required dramatic revision, attitudes towards
what should be disclosed to shareholders have required reexamina-
tion." SAB 92 means that companies will have to work harder to
meet SEC disclosure requirements.2 8 It also means an increase in
the quantity and quality of information provided to shareholders
and potential investors, allowing them to make better informed
200. Dean Takahashi, Rockwell Gives Extra Report on Cleanup Costs Invest-
ing: O.C.-Based Company Says the Action Was Taken In Part Because of An
SEC Inquiry and the Fact That Such Information Will Soon Be Required, L.A.
TIMES, Dec. 14, 1993, at D1.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. See Andreoli, supra note 188.
208. Richard Y. Roberts, Remarks at the Corporate Council Conference at the
New Jersey Institute for Continuing Legal Education (May 5, 1995), available in
1995 WL 275552, at *3.
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investment decisions.2' As overall investor confidence in the
companies increases, there will be a corresponding benefit to com-
panies, shareholders, and investors."' At the same time, stricter
SEC disclosure requirements, as well as increased cooperation
between the SEC and the EPA, make it clear that companies that
continue to neglect environmental liabilities in their financial dis-
closure statements will find themselves paying for their intransi-
gence.2 '
CONCLUSION
Through the augmented disclosure standards outlined in SAB 92,
the SEC has taken an incremental step towards eliminating overly
general environmental liability disclosures. The release of SAB 92
places corporations under greater pressure to provide concrete fig-
ures for ambiguously defined environmental liabilities by delineat-
ing the boundaries of the equally ambiguous Regulation S-K envi-
ronmental liability disclosure requirements. In the long run, more
comprehensive reporting will lead to greater investor confidence,
benefiting both investors and corporations. In the short term, inves-
tors should not react in haste to augmented disclosures. Instead,
investors should use the information to make better investment
decisions, rewarding companies who handle environmental liabili-
ties responsibly and increasing the accountability of those who do
not.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Schwartz, supra note 32, at 316.
